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Abstract
The response to civil disturbances has historically been the aggressive use of force or
escalation with tactics such as the use of police dogs, armed federal troops during war
protests, and police field forces. These types of tactics can escalate tensions between
protestors and police and only add to the violence and destruction of the incident. To
reduce the violence between protestors and the police and the destruction often associated
with civil disturbances, it is necessary to examine the need to include de-escalation
techniques in the responses. This study utilized 3 theoretical frameworks, the chaos
theory, the behavioral decision theory and the strain theory, all which complement each
other in interpreting the opinions and experiences of participants and civil disturbance
responses. The research questions were used to determine the influence of experience,
training, personal biases or external influences on decision making and elicit the opinions
of respondents in how they would respond to a civil disturbance. Twenty-five
respondents responsible for policy or response decisions regarding civil disturbances
from southern U.S. state emergency management and law enforcement agencies took part
in the survey. The results of a cross-tabulation analysis determined that there is a need for
the inclusion of de-escalation techniques and that they would be effective in civil
disturbances. The results also showed that an aggressive response was the preferred
method to restoring or maintaining order, but there was a need to examine changes in
response tactics. This study may be beneficial and provide a social impact through policy
changes, which may lead to a lessening of the severity and scope of an incident.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Background
Communities exist and flourish when normalcy is in effect; there is no chaos and
no need for intervention by the government. On occasion, protests, civil disturbances, or
riots occur, disrupting the normalcy of a community and in some cases plunging it into
chaos. Farazmand (2003) suggests that, for the field of emergency management,
“unpredictable events” such as riots can lead to disastrous results for organizations
(p.339). It is then the duty of a jurisdiction to either maintain normalcy or return it from a
state of chaos to one of normalcy as quickly as possible. In doing so, jurisdictions rely on
the response of their police forces to maintain that order or return a situation, such as a
riot, from a state of chaos to normalcy.
Historical as well as current methods of response to civil disturbances or riots
have relied on an aggressive show of force by authorities using armed military troops,
police dogs, and riot forces to maintain control or regain normalcy. The response of the
police may also contribute to whether chaos is avoided, and normalcy is maintained.
Myers-Montgomery (2016) suggested that the militaristic appearance of law enforcement
in response to a civil disturbance is a factor contributing to escalations in a riot. Newburn
(2016) examined three areas of why riots do not occur: Katz’s (2008, 2012) explanation
of the social mobility of minorities, Naegler’s (2014) examination of tension reduction
between police and minorities, and Myers’s (2000) examination of why riots spread but
did not describe any actions or techniques related to establishing de-escalation policies.
Variables underlying political, economic, or social conditions of communities, such as

2
strength (the number of officers versus the number of protestors), the type of protest
requested, and a historical record of the groups protesting, could be applied to deescalation strategies.
It is then logical to suggest that if one wishes to maintain normalcy, then the
reduction of tactics (de-escalation) would be desired, versus the increase in tactics
(escalation), which may only exacerbate underlying tensions, leading to the creation of
chaos, which in this case would be a riot. It can be argued that decision-making is an
important element of and contributing factor to, why some peaceful and lawful protests,
turn violent and in some cases into riots. Poor decision-making and the reliance on
previous tactics or methods of crowd control only add to the amount of escalation.
Simonson and Staw (1992) stated that “little attention has yet been given to procedures
that might help people avoid the escalation trap” (p. 419). If the same old tactics of
escalation are considered detrimental to the overall mission of response to a civil
disturbance, it is rational to consider de-escalation techniques in these situations.
Problem Statement
Historically, responses to civil disturbances or riots have been characterized by
aggressive shows and uses of force (i.e., escalation). Since the 1960s, tactics such as the
use of police dogs in Birmingham, AL, in 1963 (Maurantonio, 2014), armed federal
troops during war protests at Kent State University in 1970 (Steidl, 2013) and police field
forces, have been utilized to restore order and achieve normalcy in the community
(Miller, 2001). The individuals who decide the responses to civil disturbances as a
general rule, should always seek ways to de-escalate rather than have a confrontation
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between rioters and police. The problem of escalating an event versus de-escalating and
avoiding destruction and disruption within the community, is one that can be appreciated
across our country and by others around the world. The deployment of resources in
response to a civil disturbance is actuality an escalation of the situation by the
government. Simonson and Staw (1992) suggested that the study of de-escalation
techniques could provide a basis for emergency managers from the escalation of
situations and the over commitment of resources.
Therefore, the problem is that, although researchers know that current responses
by the government towards civil disturbances are considered escalation, it has not been
determined whether there a need for de-escalation techniques to be incorporated into
policies and response protocols. The study will contribute to the knowledge in this field
by addressing whether there is a need to include de-escalation techniques into the
responses to civil disturbances or riots. The social benefit of this research is that policy
makers can use the findings to inform policy changes which could lessen the severity and
scope of an incident.
Research Purpose
The purpose of this research is to bridge the gap in literature and explore aspects
of de-escalation techniques and whether there is a need to incorporate such techniques
into response policies as tactics that could be used to reduce the violence between
protestors and the police and the destruction often associated with riots. The goal of law
enforcement and the emergency managers who design policy in this area is to maintain
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normalcy or return to normalcy from a state of chaos, which is the basis of the chaos
theory (Farazmand, 2003).
Theoretical Framework
The chaos theory was “founded on the mathematics of nonlinear systems” (Kiel &
Elliot, 1996, p. 2). In comparing linear and nonlinear systems in the context of a civil
disturbance, a scenario occurs where the police confront a protest and deploy a group of
officers to engage the protestors, who then heed warnings and directions from police and
conform to those requests being made. This is an example of a linear system where the
police expect and get a definitive response, one that they expected. The nonlinear system
example, or the unexpected, would be to take in all other possibilities, including
nonconformity to lawful requests, the infusion of violence and criminal activity, or an
unnecessary need to escalate the situation. With the possibility of chaos erupting from
normalcy, or a peaceful event turning violent, there must be an examination of the
response and if there was escalation by the government whether intentional or not.
The behavioral decision theory (BDT) as described by Morton and Fasolo (2009)
is the method by which people decide a course of action and the biases which influence
them. BDT is important in showing that certain methods, which may be tried and true,
may no longer be acceptable or practical, such as the continued escalation of an incident
versus the consideration of de-escalation techniques. Riots and violent civil disturbances
throughout American history have started from small benign incidents or protests and
have escalated, mostly because of the responses by police based in what could be
considered poor decision-making.
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Regardless of the technique used by emergency managers, police chiefs, or
politicians, the response to civil disturbances are as Costello (2015) stated, “one of those
impossible jobs”. The impossible job framework was first proposed by Glidewell and
Hargrove (1990) as a public administration theory, as a mechanism to categorize
impossible jobs. Costello (2015) also offered the opinion that tasks within a civil
disturbance may be difficult but not impossible. These tasks or committing to courses of
action, may result in the escalation of a situation instead of the desired results of
diffusion. Jurisdictions, specifically decision-makers, who do not commit to a course of
action in the end, may result in a losing proposition, that is, escalating versus deescalating.
Research Questions and Hypothesis
In this study, I examined the premise that current responses by government
officials are no longer practical when applied to civil disturbances or riots and that the
need for de-escalation techniques or methods exist. I also examined whether decision
makers are considering underlying political, economic or social conditions of
communities affected by civil disturbances and whether the consideration of those
conditions affect which type of response to an incident is made. The research questions
(RQs) for this study were as follows:
RQ1. Would the lack of experience versus actual experience influence the type of
response action taken?
RQ2. Would training, policies, biases or external stimuli, influence the type of
response action taken?
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RQ3. Would the influences of politics, economic or social conditions contribute
to the decision-making factors such as to respond passively or aggressively?
RQ4. Would the inclusion techniques such as de-escalation contribute positively
in maintaining order in a community?
The null hypothesis for each is that no such positive relationship exists.
Methodology
Using a quantitative method, I conducted this study by surveying law enforcement
and emergency management professionals, including policy group members responsible
for policy decisions, as well as officers and mid-level supervisors who may be tasked
with carrying out those policies The chaos, behavioral decision, and strain theories
served as a basis to elicit responses to identify if there is a need for de-escalation
techniques in response to civil disturbances. Because the aim of the research was only to
identify the need for de-escalation versus actual techniques, the quantitative method was
best suited for compiling data for evaluation. I conducted a survey of professional law
enforcement and emergency management officials through the use of a self-administered
questionnaire through the internet survey collection service, Survey Monkey
(https://www.surveymonkey.com).
The research was conducted throughout the South Florida law enforcement and
emergency management population. I chose this sample population due to a long history
of riots from the 1960s through the 1980s and civil disturbances in the 1990s and in 2003.
The benefit of utilizing this population sampling was that it had a strong pool of
participants with extensive experience. Using South Florida and its history of civil
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disturbances allows for the replication of the research, if needed, in the future in another
community with a similar history to that of South Florida. The research method will be
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.
Significance
Civil protests can occur peacefully or may turn violent, resulting in injuries,
deaths, and the destruction of communities. In this research, my goal was to identify
whether there is a need to implement ideas, techniques, and strategies that can be adopted
by a jurisdiction to preempt the possibility of violence from escalating from a peaceful
protest to a full-scale riot. The gathering of data from surveys completed by the
respondents will have quantifiable data to analyze and interpret. The results of this study
could lead to the establishment of new policy directives.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
Throughout the history of the United States, civil disturbances have occurred
because of protests to wars, social inequalities and confrontations with police. The
conventional methods of responding to such incidents in past decades, have involved the
use of aggressive and violent means to restore order. These methods included the use of
escalation methods such as deploying federal troops (Steidl, 2013), police field forces
(Miller, 2001), militaristic looking equipment (Meyers-Montgomery, 2016) and tactics
and police K-9 dogs (Maurantonio, 2014). De-escalation techniques are relatively new
ideas being proposed in law enforcement to reduce violent confrontations and uses of
force, but none have been applied to civil disturbances. De-escalation techniques are the
nonphysical methods of dealing with violent or aggressive behaviors. These de-escalation
techniques have been utilized in the mental health field (Price, Baker, Bee, & Lovel,
2015) and for developing use-of-force policies in law enforcement (International
Association of Chiefs of Police, 2017), but not in civil disturbances or riots. Deescalation techniques with the mentally ill include verbal and nonphysical methods to
replace, when possible, the use of physical restraints, which have led to patient deaths
from positional asphyxia (Price et al., 2015). Law enforcement agencies across the
country must also confront situations involving violent and aggressive persons and are
turning more and more to de-escalation techniques to reduce use of force in resolving
those incidents until additional resources or options are available (International
Association of Chiefs of Police, 2017). What is not known is how de-escalation
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techniques can be applied to civil disturbances. The basic premise of this study is based
on the idea that current responses by government officials are no longer practical when
applied to civil disturbances or riots and whether de-escalation techniques or methods are
needed.
The purpose of this chapter is to identify gaps in the research, through applicable
theoretical framework(s), and review the previous research and methodological
approaches to determine whether there is a need to include de-escalation techniques into
the responses to civil disturbances or riots.
Literature Search Strategy
For this study, I reviewed literature from 2011 through 2017 on the chaos theory,
the BDM, de-escalation, and escalation, with the inclusion of seminal works from outside
the stated time frame. The strategy used for this literature review included simultaneous
searches of numerous databases, using the Walden University Thoreau search tool to
identify the relevant literature throughout numerous databases. The following keywords
were used: de-escalation and strategies, emergency management, incident command
systems, chaos theory, transformational theory, nonlinear dynamics and chaos,
Behavioral Decision Theory (BDT), choice under uncertainty, escalation, evaluation,
public administration analysis, and strain theory.
Additionally, I consulted the following journals as sources: American
Sociological Review, Annual Review of Psychology, British Journal of Political Science,
Criminal Justice and Behavior, Expanded Academic ASAP, International Journal of
Medical Toxicology and Forensic Medicine, Journal of Atmospheric Sciences, Journal of
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Homeland Security Affairs, Journal of the Operational Research Society, Journalism and
Mass Communication Quarterly, Public Organization Review, Management Decision,
Resonance, and The Social Science Research.
Research on the dependent variables, which are the response types to the actual
civil disturbance, was evaluated to define the construct used for measurement purposes.
The dependent variables, which are aggressive and non-aggressive responses, were
evaluated to determine the requirements needed to define the construct for measurement
based on their application in a civil disturbance and how they could change an event, with
respect to the chaos theory’s premise of maintaining normalcy or returning to a state of
normalcy.
The independent variables in this study, the influences on the process for deciding
whether to use an escalated or de-escalated response, were examined to define the
construct for measurement purposes. Several independent variables, the underlying
political, economic or social conditions, the influencers of what may be the cause of riots,
were examined to measure if they affect the decision-making process of emergency
managers, as to what type of response will be deployed to the civil disturbance.
In the first section, I will discuss the historical background of civil disturbances
and their responses. The historical background literature is based on the research of
Simonson and Staw (1992), Miller (2001), Steidl (2013), Maurantonio (2014), and
Meyers-Montgomery (2016).
The second section of this literature review will include a discussion of the
theoretical framework, based on the chaos theory, along with contributing frameworks,
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the strain theory and the BDT. The chaos theory is being tested to determine if the
dependent variables are influenced by the independent variables, causing the chaos theory
to be affected in not maintaining or returning to a state of normalcy.
In the third section of this literature review, I will discuss the different
independent and dependent variables involved. The independent variables examined will
provide data regarding the political, economic, or social conditions of communities to
define the construct of this study. This political construct definition is based on the
research of Hahn (1970); Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon (2010); White (2013);
McHugh (2015); Baltimore City Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge #3 (2015); the
Department of Justice (2015); Meyers-Montgomery (2016); and Pritchard and Pakes
(2016). The economic construct definition is based on the research of the Kerner
Commission (1968); Spilerman (1970); Scacco (2010); Morrell, Scott, McNeish, and
Webster (2011); and Simpkin and Sapsed (2012). The construct of social issues is based
on research by Merton (1967), Corwin, (1993), Olzak and Shanahan, (1996), DiPasqualea
and Glaeser (1998), Marker (2004), the U.S. Department of Justice (2015), and Brown
(2017). The dependent variables of aggressive (escalation) and nonaggressive responses
(de-escalation) provide data defining the construct of the study. The aggressive
(escalation) construct is based on the research of Curseu, Schruijer, and Fodor (2016) and
Simonson and Staw (1992). The nonaggressive (de-escalation) construct is based on the
research of Kesic, Thomas, and Ogloff (2013) and Price et al. (2015).
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The last section of this chapter will identify the specific gaps in the literature,
specifically the need or not, for de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances from the
results of the literature review, which supports the need for this research study.
Historical Context
Civil disturbances historically, have prompted aggressive uses of force and tactics
by authorities in order to regain order where riots or civil unrest were occurring. This
included the use of the federalized military troops as seen at Kent State University in
1970 during anti-war protests (Steidl, 2013), the use of police dogs in Birmingham,
Alabama, in 1963 (Maurantonio, 2014) and police field forces to restore order (Miller,
2001). The use of these tactics has been the same from time of the civil rights protests of
the late 1950s, to the antiwar protests of the 1960s, to the current antipolice protests that
started in Ferguson, Missouri and Baltimore, Maryland in 2014-2015.
Each of the previous examples began as peaceful or nonviolent civil protests or
everyday encounters between citizens and the police, which then turned violent and, in
some cases, deadly. In examining whether de-escalation techniques are necessary, there
must be an examination of the response polices to civil disturbances and ask whether it is
necessary for the police to deploy or respond to each protest or act of civil disobedience.
Simonson and Staw (1992) suggested that reductions in the underlying tensions in
a situation are made could de-escalate those situations, which may be applicable to events
such as a peaceful protest turning violent. Sources of tensions could include the mere
presence of the police or a response force or the manner in which they are dressed or
equipped (Meyers-Montgomery (2016). Considering that the unnecessary commitment of
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resources, which is a standard course of action, may simply be an escalation factor which
is the catalyst that leads to the violence often seen in civil disturbances.
Meyers-Montgomery (2016) stated that most blame for the loss of life in civil
disturbances, especially those which occur without permits, is the militarization of the
police. The police have changed the tactics of using police dogs, batons, and water
cannons and replaced them with armored vehicles, rifles, and new technology, such as
long-range acoustic crowd dispersal devices. While the point made by MeyersMontgomery is a tactical one, one de-escalation technique would be to include BDT thus
reducing the need for the deployment of resources or escalation of an event in the first
place.
Theoretical Frameworks
The chaos theory is the theoretical framework that will be used to reinforce this
study. The chaos theory is being utilized as the primary framework because the current
responses by the government towards civil disturbances are to maintain a state of
normalcy or to return to normalcy from chaos and it is the goal of this research to
determine if there a need for de-escalation techniques to be incorporated into policies and
response protocols. There are two additional theories, the Strain Theory and the BDT
which will be utilized to help explain how the independent and dependent variables
influence one another. It is important to consider all frameworks as contributing factors to
determining the need for de-escalation techniques for the following reasons.
The chaos theory will examine the non-linear aspects of the civil disturbance, that
is, what course the event may take versus what is expected by planners and decision
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makers. When an event does not progress or evolve as planned, the “linear progression”
changes and decisions must be made to keep it from devolving into chaos and trying to
maintain normalcy as proposed by Farazmand (2003). The strain theory will be utilized to
try and identify underlying political, economic or social conditions, which may be
influences as to why riots occur. The BDT, will incorporate the concepts of whether the
current standardized and often used response techniques, are no longer valid and if there
is now a need to evaluate policies with respect to civil disturbances. Historically, the
decision process in the type of response to a civil disturbance has been based on an
aggressive use of field forces.
Chaos Theory
The chaos theory was developed by Dr. Edward Norton Lorenz in 1963 (Lorenz,
1963) through the experimentation of weather forecasting. Krishnamurthy (2015) states
that the theory developed by Lorenz at its essence, is the growth in differences by two
separate states, however small, to the larger differences of the two random states. As the
theory was developed for weather forecasting, it was based on the inaccuracy of weather
predictions over the long-term. The theory became known as the “butterfly effect” with
the premise of “does the flap of a butterfly’s wings in Brazil set off a tornado in Texas?”
(Krishnamurthy, 2015). This premise is applicable to this research in that small or benign
incidents can grow exponentially into a large and unmanageable civil disturbance or riot
as the result of a ripple effect, like the analogy of the butterfly wings.
Murphy (1996) suggests that chaos is not random in its development but is the
result of systems which do not evolve in a linear fashion or as predicted. Civil
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disturbances or riots when examined in their entirety, do have distinctive patterns and
structures, but it is not realistic to forecast what may or could happen based on past
events either from the same incident or a previous one. Farazmand (2003) in examining
the relationships of systems or their segments, suggests that it is important to know why
opposing systems or segments change, become unstable and from a new order or
stability. The primary focus of any emergency management official is to try and prevent
chaos by maintaining a normalcy in the community or returning it from chaos, as quickly
as possible. Chaos in the form of a civil disturbance or riot, is a social phenomenon that
may be planned for, but is unpredictable and to maintain normalcy in the community, its
destructive effects must be controlled.
Strain Theory
Merton (1967) hypothesizes in Marker (2004) that individuals who engage in
aberrant behavior or activities when structural barriers exist preventing the attainment of
goals desired by most in society. Strain theory assumes that members of society adhere to
societal values to achieve cultural goals. Additionally, strain theory assumes that socially
disadvantaged individuals cannot achieve cultural goals legitimately resulting in the
individual abandoning their personal standards and values. Because of the inability of the
individual to attain their goals, the possibility of illegal behaviors can manifest
themselves as a response to those failures (p. 12).
Marker (2004) suggests that violent action (e.g., rioting) are the result of the
breakdown of changing cultural norms when social structures impede an individual from
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achieving societal goals (p. 12). The impediments to social achievement by an individual
include education, political stature and financial independence.
The strain theory is relevant to this research specifically with respect to the
independent variables discussed later in this chapter. The independent variables align in
examining the historical look at the underlying political, economic or social conditions of
communities who have experienced riots.
Behavioral Decision Theory
Experiences have shown that not all decision makers make the correct decisions
in times of crisis and sometimes repeat their mistakes which compounds the complexity
of the response to an incident. During these crisis events, the decision-making structure
may only include a single issue or may be more complex and consist of “multi-criteria
decision analysis (MCDA)” (Morton & Fasolo, 2009, p.1). During civil disturbances or
riots there are often, times of critical decision-making, involving numerous factors which
may or may not be related, but none the less, must be dealt with simultaneously.
Morton & Fasolo (2009) suggest that the BDT be utilized for the following
reasons. The first is to understand the thought process of those making decisions without
assistance and the second is to identify biases which may affect those decisions. The
MCDA process consists of structuring, assessing values, weighting criteria and sensitivity
analysis. Structuring represents the decision makers goals and objectives during an
incident and is important to consider as a part of the de-escalation process. The
assessment of values during an incident is important in determining if the course of action
to be taken is for example a good one tactically. As an example, would the deployment of
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riot control forces exacerbate the situation in a negative way or will the results be a
positive result.
Conclusion
The theories examined for this research all have contributory aspects into the way
responses to civil disturbances are conducted, along with factors which affect the
decision-making processes of those responses. The public, those who watch these civil
disturbances today, do so from a 24-hour news perspective based on innuendo and nonfactual information from reporters and residents who are not privy to the influences of the
decision-making process. As such, the time-tested responses to civil disturbances, large
field police field forces, less-lethal weapons and militaristic looking equipment, are
interpreted by the public as being too harsh or heavy-handed and do not consider the
underlying political, economic or social conditions of communities, when trying to
maintain or restore order according to the chaos theory. The literature provides ample
information regarding the chaos theory and the basis upon which incidents may or may
not follow a linear progression, as well as the factors involved in decision-making, but
there is a gap in the information regarding de-escalation and its applicability to civil
disturbances.
Variables
Independent Variables
Creswell (2013) defines an independent variable “as those that (probably) cause,
influence or affect outcomes” (p. 50). The independent variables to be considered will
include a historical look at the underlying political, economic or social conditions of
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communities who have experienced riots. These independent variables while not
complete in totality, may provide enough rationale as to how civil disturbances devolve
from peaceful protests into riots and if the decisions to use either an escalation or deescalation are influenced by them.
Political activity. Politics in America as with most other countries is based upon
power and trying to maintain stability or attempting to make changes incrementally or by
large power grabs. The structure of the United States’ Constitution guarantees the right of
free speech and assembly (within lawful means). As a result, the United States embraces
what Dalton et al. (2010) describe as an open “Political Opportunity Structure” (POS),
which encourages political activity and protest.
Examples of the POS encouraging political activity and protest became evident
during “the Baltimore Riots of 2015” where the Mayor, Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, said
her city government “gave those who wished to destroy space to do that,” (McHugh,
2015). In addition, according to the Baltimore City Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge #3
After-Action-Report (2015), orders were issued by Police Commissioner, “the Baltimore
Police Department would not respond until they [the protestors] burned, looted, and
destroyed the city so that it would show that the rioters were forcing our hand.”
In an article by Hahn (1970) conducted in the aftermath of the turbulent decade of
the 1960s in which many American cities experienced riots from within their AfricanAmerican communities, he examined why some incidents provoke outbreaks of violence
while others do not. Hahn suggested that while violence may occur in some communities
and not in others, may be the inability of those local political structures to resolve issues
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on the local level. It is this inability to resolve issues that contributes to the end result,
violence in the community. In the same research article in aftermath of the 1967 Detroit
riots, Hahn surveyed residents of that city who responded by a total of sixty-three
percent, that the threat of violence had significant influence on politicians to respond to
the needs of the African-American community (p. 102).
Political correctness must also now be considered when responding to a protest or
civil disturbance. The Ferguson, Missouri riots of 2014, which grew from protests against
police, in which a black man was killed by a white police officer. The Department of
Justice in their After-Action-Report (2015) found that police response measures to the
riots were in some cases, improper. In the report, findings were made in which the
“optic” of canine units were thought to stir emotions because of racial tensions in those
observing the protests and those actually protesting. The “militarization” of the police
also was found to be inappropriate because this too, inflamed tensions and created a fear
within the protestors. The need to curtail the response actions of police by politicians is
consistent with POS in allowing protests.
The motivations of crowds may be the driving force of whether a peaceful protest
devolves into a riot or if the crowd provides the “spark” which leads to a loss of control
of an event by authorities. In a study by White (2013) crowd types (peaceful, purposeful,
or hostile crowds) were examined to isolate violence in crowd behaviors, by observing
different types of public events. Observable variables were introduced to try and
understand if crowds become violent because of the individual or if the individual is
changed by the crowd. White’s research determined that the “crowd” is a very dangerous
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entity. Individuals may no longer maintain independence but instead, become the mob,
which may have its own motivations and outcomes beyond the control of the individual.
The type of crowd present during a peaceful protest or one that evolves into the driving
force of a riot may contribute to the decision-making process of emergency managers in
whether to use escalation or de-escalation measures.
Meyers-Montgomery (2016) suggested that there is a link between the
“militarized” response of police to “unpermitted protests” and an aggressive mindset.
Meyers-Montgomery stated that unpermitted protests are a challenge of police authority
and control and because of this, police leadership encourages a militaristic response
which involves the use of specialized weapons and tactics. Meyers-Montgomery suggests
that “unpermitted” protestors have a right to peacefully assemble and that it is the
presence of militarized police which is the trigger point or spark that creates the riot
situation. Meyers-Montgomery suggests that police intervention in “unpermitted
protests” is a social problem where citizens cannot express their “social dissent”. If
Meyers-Montgomery is to be considered correct and the mere presence of police is the
trigger point of many riots, the deployment of riot control resources would fall within the
de-escalation decisions that should be considered by policy officials. The author suggests
that the more militaristic looking a police force is in response to an event, the greater the
propensity for civil rights violations and police brutality.
Economic conditions. Economic conditions contribute to civil disturbances as an
underlying factor in justifying protests and the actions of protestors. The mass migration
of African-Americans from the south to the large northern cities after World War II as an
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example, has contributed to overcrowded cities with increasing poverty and a lack of jobs
for its residents. The literature which has been examined is consistent in the fact the riots
of the 1960s and to the present day are exacerbated by the individual, who is lacking in
wealth or opportunity and a perpetual feeling of hopelessness.
On July 28, 1967, President Lyndon Johnson established the Kerner Commission
after violent riots in numerous cities across America in that summer of 1967, most
prominently in Newark, New Jersey and Detroit, Michigan. The commission examined;
what happened, why and how could they be prevented in the future. In examining the
“why” of the report, several areas were examined, unemployment, family structure, social
disorganization and living conditions within the African-American community (Kerner
Commission, 1968). The Kerner Commission report was conducted by interviewing the
participants of the numerous riots it was investigating. The commission described the
rioter as an African-American male, 15-24 years of age, with limited education (some
high school), making low wages in menial or low-skilled jobs that may not be steady (not
full-time and subject to layoffs) and felt a sense of despair due to the lack of opportunity
from a discriminatory employer (p. 75).
Spilerman (1970) examined 341 separate riot events from 1961 to 1968 in the
African-American communities across the country to account for disorder-proneness. The
variables examined included a lack of social integration, exclusion from the political
process and the sense of desperation in achieving goals. Promises from the federal
government to improve the African-American community’s economic conditions have
been met by indecision, failed initiatives and betrayal only add to their despair (p. 646).
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Spilerman concluded that the propensity for violence was not attributed to the
community, but to the individual, suggesting the larger the population the greater the
likelihood of disorder (p. 645).
Scacco (2010) examined riots in Nigeria and makes the argument that poverty
increases the potential for individuals to participate in riots if they are with others of
similar standing. It is suggested that an individual poverty and social networks increase
the probability of his/her participation once a riot occurs due to their socially vulnerable
status.
Morrell et al. (2011) in a report prepared for the Cabinet Office in Great Britain
examined the 2011 riots in that country. Like their counterparts in the United States, the
rioters across Great Britain blamed their involvement on economic and societal issues.
Rioters explained that looting was due to a lack of income, job opportunities which added
to a feeling of despair and the lack of belonging to society.
Simpkin and Sapsed (2012) also examined why the English riots of 2011 occurred
and that commonalties between the many areas which experienced those events. Among
the variables that they examined included crime, unemployment and education and were
defined as predictors. Simpkin and Sapsed (2012) research also considered the
opportunistic criminals in riots but provided a “liberal” view of riot causes due to socioeconomic reasons, such as low standards of living, high unemployment, the
disillusionment of young people.
Social issues. Social issues in relationship to civil disturbances are often long
simmering systemic issues such as race relations, mistreatment of African-Americans by
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law enforcement and feelings of hopelessness in African-American communities. Olzak
and Shanahan (1996) suggest that deprivation in the African-American community is not
found in a growing black underclass but one of competition from local demographics and
unemployment which contributes to riots.
Brown (2017) compares the social conditions in the aftermath of the Watts (Los
Angeles, California) Riots of 1965 and the Ferguson, Missouri riots of 2014. In each
event, a violent encounter with law enforcement is suggested as the trigger point for the
subsequent rioting. Brown states that even though each event is fifty years apart, the same
social conditions still exist. Brown references The Clark Report (1965) in describing
conditions after the Watts Riot as hopeless and one of despair among the Los Angeles
African-American community resulting from unemployment, poor education, and hostile
police-community relations.
In the examination of the Ferguson Riot of 2014, Brown describes the social
conditions in the leadup to the shooting of an African-American man by a white police
officer. In the immediate aftermath of the shooting, residents began to violently protest
and loot local stores, but order was quickly restored by a strong law enforcement
presence. Several months after the initial shooting event, a Grand Jury failed to indict the
police officer involved based on the evidence in the case, but residents saw this as just
another example of law enforcement violence against African-Americans. As a result, a
full-blown riot including looting, arson and shootings erupted in Ferguson. Because of
the allegations of oppression of the Ferguson African-American community by the
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Ferguson Police Department, the United States Department of Justice found that a pattern
of constitutional violations (Brown, 2017).
In the intervening years between the Watts Riot of 1965 and the Ferguson Riot of
2014, the United States did not go without rioting. The 1980s were exemplified by
Miami, Florida which experienced three riots and in 1992, Los Angeles was once again in
the spotlight with the Rodney King Riots.
In the 1980s, Miami experienced numerous riots after incidents involving police
officers and African-Americans. In 1980, the McDuffie Riots, occurred after an AfricanAmerican motorist Arthur McDuffie, died after being beaten by police for a traffic
violation. In 1982, an African-American man was killed by a Miami Police Officer in an
arcade after being stopped for suspected drug possession. In 1989, a Miami Police
Officer shot an African-American man who was fleeing from police on a motorcycle.
These events acted as “triggers” for underlying social issues such as race relations,
unemployment and immigration in Miami, which exploded into riots. Two factors which
are related with respect to Miami are unemployment and the influx of Cuban and Haitian
immigrants into the community, which many African-American consider as a major
reason for unemployment. The lack of commitment to the African-American community
after the 1980 McDuffie Riot was shown by local officials after monies which were
promised to the community’s redevelopment, were spent on projects outside the
neighborhoods affected by the rioting. These and other factors contribute to a pessimism
in the Miami African-American community that there is no hope of success (Corwin,
1993).
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The City of Los Angeles experienced more rioting in 1992 after the acquittal of
white police officers in the beating of Rodney King which became known as the Rodney
King Riots. DiPasqualea & Glaeser (1998) examined the 1992 Los Angeles Riots for the
variables of unemployment, poverty and social responsibilities. The authors found that
most rioters in the 1992 Los Angeles Riots were African-American, between the ages of
16 to 30, and an unemployment rate of twenty-five percent (p. 70). Poverty rates in Los
Angeles were found to be lower versus other urban areas across the nation. Lastly, the
authors found that a large percentage of households in the African-American community
of South Central, Los Angeles, over thirty-five percent, were headed by a female, which
was higher than other urban areas across the nation (p. 73). South Central Los Angeles
also experienced a shift in population demographics with whites moving out and being
replaced with Hispanics and Asians which is similar to Miami’s influx of Cubans and
Caribbean immigrants (p. 73).
Conclusion
Politics or political activity for better or worse is intertwined in everything that we
do as a society, from political power grabs, to political correctness and social justice. The
literature describes the concept of Political Opportunity Structure (POS) which
encourages political activity and protest. The literature examined historical riots of 1967
in Detroit, Michigan where residents used the simple threat of violence in pressuring
politicians to respond to the needs of the African-American community. The tactics used
by police have also been called into question in how a response to a riot is executed.
Anti-police rioters have suggested that the police have become too militaristic in their
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appearance, tactics and weaponry that they use. The after-action report of the United
States Department of Justice (DOJ) to the Ferguson, Missouri riots of 2014, found that
the police “militaristic look” and use of canine units, when examined through the lens of
race, raised tensions between the community and the police (Institute for
Intergovernmental Research, 2015) (United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights
Division, 2015). Meyers-Montgomery (2016) suggests similar points of contention as that
of the DOJ report on the Ferguson, Missouri riots of 2014. The author suggests that the
more aggressive the response of police, the more likelihood that civil rights violations
and police brutality will occur. POS and its openness may be the perfect avenue of some
jurisdictions set on social change, as Hahn (1970) suggested, to address issues locally,
which in choosing a de-escalation avenue, allow a riot to go unchallenged to further that
social change.
In examining the many reasons for the causes of riots, there are similar if not
universal reasons that can be associated with them. In examining the literature of the last
half century, researchers have consistently linked the variables associated with low
income, unemployment and a feeling of despair as “reasons” for rioting. The literature
contained a cross-section of examples from countries in three different continents, all
with similar types of causation associated with how riots may have started. While
opportunistic individuals are present in many of the different riot locations, the causation
for why riots started returns to the socioeconomic levels in each community which
experienced a riot, as a way of excusing the behavior.
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In the “Political Opportunity Structure” (POS) described by Dalton et al. (2010)
political activity and protest is encouraged. The question must be asked of decision
makers, would a de-escalation decision be made to not engage protestors, thus allowing
protests, similar to what Piven and Cloward (2011) proposed in their strategy to effect
social changes, such as collapsing the federal welfare system, forcing all persons to be
paid a guaranteed annual income.
The literature provides a constant theme of despair for the African-American
community and the ability of those to fulfill any dreams and aspirations they may have.
Frustrations build to explosive situations and are “triggered” by events which bring these
feelings to the forefront via the violent means of rioting.
Dependent Variables
Dependent variables are defined by Creswell (2013) “as those variables which are
dependent upon independent variable for influences and outcomes” (p. 50). The
dependent variables that will be utilized in this study will include the types of responses,
aggressive (escalation) or non-aggressive (de-escalation) to civil disturbances. The type
of decision made by emergency managers, may make the difference in an incident such
as civil protest turning into a riot or maintaining the normalcy of a community. Law
enforcement is allowed, although it may be varied by jurisdiction, to use force to either
maintain the peace (normalcy) of a community or return it from a state of chaos. It is the
decisions of whether to use non-aggressive actions to deescalate the situation or continue
the standard aggressive escalation responses currently in use.
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De-escalation. The use of force by law enforcement is legally authorized as a
measure of enforcing lawful orders to either maintain or restore order (Price et al., 2015),
while de-escalation is the use of nonphysical methods to manage violence or aggression
in a person (Kesic, et al., 2013). De-escalation is defined by the Meriam-Webster
dictionary (2017); “to decrease in extent, volume, or scope”. Simonson and Staw (1992)
define de-escalation as the lessening of the “variables or forces that have been shown
previously to underlie escalation tendencies” (p.1). In the mental health field, deescalation techniques are utilized as non-physical methods of dealing with a violent or
aggressive patient (Price et al., 2015).
Escalation. Escalation from a project management point of view, is described by
Curseu et al. (2016) as an Escalation of Commitment (EOC), that is, an over investment
in one’s resources. This is applicable in understanding the theory of this research and
determining if de-escalation is needed in civil disturbances because of an un-needed
deployment of resources, to what may be a peaceful protest, to only have it escalate as
Simonson and Staw (1992) suggested. Meyers-Montgomery (2016) defines escalation as
the “militarization” of the law enforcement response “by masked and heavily armed
police officers” (p.1).
Newburn (2015) in a comparison of cities in Great Britain utilizes the “flashpoint
model” to examine “why riots don’t happen” in some cities and not in others. The
flashpoint model examines the role of police and their tactics and how this can affect a
crowd’s motivations, to either behave responsibly or erupt in violence, in accordance
with the chaos theory. The response by law enforcement to disturbances which may have
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not yet escalated into a full-blown civil disturbance or riot, is also a critical factor which
are determined by the dependent variables of escalation or de-escalation. As described by
Miller (2001) the decision to escalate or de-escalate have resulted in major incidents such
as the “Watts Riots” which occurred in the summer of 1965 in Los Angeles, California.
After a minor arrest confrontation between bystanders and members of the California
Highway Patrol (CHP), a bystander spat on one of the CHP officers, which resulted in the
decision to escalate by the officers, by wading into the crowd and arresting the offenders.
The alternative decision involving de-escalation would have been to ignore the incident
and simply withdraw and avoid the confrontation. This escalation decision caused the
incident to explode into one of the worst riots in American history, resulting in thirty-four
deaths, over one-thousand people being injured and damages in excess of forty million
dollars
Based on the premise of the chaos theory and the expected linear progression of
an incident, the results of the decision process and the selection of escalation or deescalation methods will determine if chaos emerges or normalcy is maintained.
Conclusion
The study utilizes three independent variables, to examine underlying causes of a
disturbance and two dependent variables, aggressive (escalation) or non-aggressive (deescalation) to determine responses. The literature has shown that civil disturbances begin
as small benign events which grow into larger more complex disturbances or riots,
because of the decisions to use aggressive rather than non-aggressive methods. Deescalation exists in the fields of psychology and the treatment of the mentally ill and
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verbal techniques to control aggressive persons. Escalation methods are being examined
in the context of not “over committing” to a situation, adjusting responses by law
enforcement through not deploying forces to relieve underlying tensions and by
demilitarizing response forces. Decisions which are made using the de-escalation and
escalation will be important to how the status of a civil disturbance evolves in accordance
with chaos theory.
Gap in Previous Research
In researching the current literature into de-escalation techniques several
examples exist for treating the mentally ill, the use of force by police and verbal deescalation measures were found, but none which were applicable to civil disturbances. A
research project regarding de-escalation methods comes from the medical community and
was targeted at the treatment of the mentally ill, but only those involving verbal methods
(Kesic, Thomas, & Ogloff, 2013). In a survey conducted by Mills and Ivacko (2016) for
the University of Michigan’s Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, civil disturbances
that resulted from an act of excessive force by a local law enforcement officer were
examined, but there was no correlation with the need for de-escalation techniques in
responding to them. As previously mentioned, Simonson and Staw (1992) suggested that
de-escalation could be accomplished by simply relieving escalation forces, for research of
an economic or logistical context, but once again there was no direct correlation to the
whether such techniques had been applied to civil disturbances. Morrell and Curie (2015)
use the concept of “impossible jobs” from Hargrove and Glidewell’s Impossible Jobs in
Public Management (1990) and apply it to riot policing in the United Kingdom, to
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examine how officers train for and manage riots. The study while examining the actions
(escalations) of police during a riot, does not address the need for the application of deescalation techniques at the beginning of an incident.
Conclusion
The response to civil disturbances in a historical context has been one of an
aggressive manner utilizing federal troops, militarized law enforcement, dogs and fire
hoses. In trying to find alternatives to aggressive responses by authorities to an incident
which has already exploded to a stage which the only possible response is an aggressive
one. By examining non-aggressive responses, de-escalating a situation, it is hoped that
alternatives can be found to the aggressive response. In order to achieve this, theoretical
frameworks such as the chaos theory, the strain theory and BDT, may allow for a
comprehensive approach to an incident before it spirals out of control from a harmless
protest into a full-scale riot.
Previous research identified in de-escalation, has been limited to the mentally ill,
riot response research and riot management. The research concerning escalation measures
include poor decision-making, failed courses of action, outdated policies and methods
(Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981). The literature researched in this study unfortunately, does
not address whether there is a need for new measures or if there have ever been any
attempts to apply them to the phenomenon known as the civil disturbance. Emergency
managers should consider the underlying issues (independent variables) when creating a
response to a looming civil disturbance event to see if alternative nonaggressive methods
may be practical or if current aggressive practices should be employed. Therefore, this
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study will examine the potential need for changes in response policies by using deescalation techniques in civil disturbances.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The following chapter explains the quantitative methodology employed in this
study in obtaining the opinions of law enforcement and emergency management officials
whether de-escalation techniques are needed in the response to civil disturbances. For this
study, a cross-sectional design was used to quantify the opinions and attitudes of
emergency management officials about the need for de-escalation techniques in civil
disturbances. The target population consisted of a sampling frame of law enforcement
and emergency management officials who are responsible for the decision-making
authority with regards to civil disturbances or riots within their communities. To extract
the responses of the target population, a probability sampling method was used;
specifically, a random survey of law enforcement and emergency management
population at one particular place in time using a survey instrument distributed to the
previously mentioned public officials.
Problem Statement
As stated in Chapter 1, historically speaking, the responses to civil disturbances or
riots have been aggressive shows and uses of force, or escalation. These aggressive
shows of force have included tactics such as the use of police dogs (Maurantonio, 2014),
armed federal troops (Steidl, 2013), and police field forces to restore normalcy or prevent
chaos (Miller, 2001). The individuals who are responsible for how responses to civil
disturbances are decided should, as a general rule, seek de-escalation rather than
confrontation.
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Decision-makers should always be mindful of the repercussions that their
decisions can have on their communities like destruction and chaos, due to escalating an
event unnecessarily versus de-escalating it. One such example of inadvertently escalating
a situation would be to deploy resources, instead of holding back or staging them away
from the situation in the hope of diffusing it. Simonson and Staw (1992) suggest that deescalation techniques may provide law enforcement and emergency management officials
a reference point to avoid the commitment of resources and escalation.
Therefore, in this study, I sought to determine whether there is a need for deescalation techniques to be incorporated into policies and response protocols or if law
enforcement and emergency management officials should maintain current response
protocols that may escalate the situation.
The contribution of this study to the current knowledge base is whether changes
in civil disturbance response protocols using de-escalation techniques benefit decision
makers and provide a social impact to the community through the lessening of
destruction and violence during an incident.
Research Design
For this research, I used a cross-sectional design to randomly sample law
enforcement and emergency management officials who are responsible for the decisionmaking policies for civil disturbances. A cross-sectional design allows for those being
sampled to express their own opinions, attitudes, or beliefs to a survey question based on
experiences, and background. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008) suggested that
the cross-sectional design is the most used in the social sciences and allows for the
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identification and description of any patterns between the variables in the study. The
survey method used in the collection of data involved a self-administered questionnaire
through the internet survey collection service, Survey Monkey
(https://www.surveymonkey.com).
Levels of Measurement
The target population was law enforcement and emergency management officials,
who operate daily in a high-pressure decision-making and consequence-based results due
often to politically charged variables outside of their control. Because of their
commitment to the safety of the public, there is also a professional presence that may
override political expediency or agendas in their decision-making, which keeps their
communities from falling into chaos or helps to quickly return normalcy. The survey
questioned decision makers about community conditions such as politics, economics, or
social conditions and if they influenced how they would respond to a civil disturbance.
The levels of measurement for this study included nominal and ordinal scale
levels. To establish impartiality in the data, I used the nominal level to categorize, job
titles, authority, and other characteristics of the emergency management field, whereas
the ordinal level was utilized to measure the greater than relation in the data, such as
opinions of politics, the degree of external influence and the need for change
Target Population and Sample
The target population of this research included a homogenous sample of law
enforcement and emergency management officials who are responsible for responding to
and making policy for a jurisdiction’s decision-making rationale during the time of a civil
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emergency. I conducted the research among agencies in the South Florida area, which
was selected because of historical rioting and civil disturbances in that area. Past
experiences include the Miami Riots of 1980, 1982, and 1989 which were the results of
confrontations with police officers (Mohl, 1990), and the Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas protests of 2003 (Wainwright and Ortiz, 2006), where planned protests were
“hijacked” by agitators. The sample reflected a collection of participants who best
represent, through experience and knowledge, an understanding of the workings of civil
disturbances or riots. The sample size was comprised of 25participants from among law
enforcement and emergency management officials. The survey of these officials was
conducted to prompt opinions about the feasibility of the use of de-escalation techniques
in civil disturbances. Participants were selected to obtain a varied cross-section of the
population (e.g., ages, grades, or years of experience; Mills, Durepos, & Wiebe, 2010).
Sampling Procedures
The sampling procedures employed in the collection of data consisted of
identifying a homogenous group of law enforcement and emergency managers in a major
South Florida county and inviting them to participate in the completion of a survey via
Survey Monkey. Because the survey was online, participants remained anonymous
throughout the survey process.
Instrumentation
The survey instrument I designed and constructed to use in the data collection for
was based on the Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ), which was developed by Forsyth
(1980a). The EPQ is comprised of 20 questions that are based on commonly held
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opinions or morals found in the general public. Using the EPQ framework, I developed
survey questions based on five statements. The full EPQ is attached in Appendix A.
(Forsyth, 1980b). The statements that were the basis for my survey questions are as
follows:
1. One should not perform an action which might in any way threaten the dignity
and welfare of another individual.
2. If an action could harm an innocent other, then it should not be done.
3. The dignity and welfare of people should be the most important concern in
any society.
4. Questions of what is ethical for everyone can never be resolved since what is
moral or immoral is up to the individual.
5. Rigidly codifying an ethical position that prevents certain types of actions
could stand in the way of better human relations and adjustment. (Forsyth,
1980)
The survey and questions were designed to extract the opinions of the need for deescalation techniques in civil disturbances. The survey questions utilized a Yes/No
format, along with follow-up questions using a Likert Scale to expand on those questions
which are answered in the affirmative.
A multiple-choice survey was used as the measurement instrument for my
research. The research surveyed the respondents with such factors as yes/no, agreement,
values (relevance and frequency), importance, and likelihood scales. The multiple-choice
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survey instrument contained questions answerable through the selection of a response
which was coded with symbols to capture the survey answers.
In the following sample question, the respondent is asked a yes/no question which
were captured by a multiple-choice survey in Survey Monkey. Prior to the start of the
survey participants must first acknowledge the survey consent form. The respondent then
answers the questions in order until all are answered.
Survey Questions
1. Which discipline do you most closely align your duties?
a. Emergency Management
b. Law Enforcement
2. What is your experience (in years) in this position?
a. 0 - 5 years
b. 5 - 10 years
c. 10 - 15 years
d. 15 – 20 years
e. More than 20 years
3. Has your jurisdiction experienced a civil disturbance and how would it be
characterized? Yes/No
a. No, my jurisdiction has not experienced a civil disturbance.
b. Yes, Permitted protests
c. Yes, Unpermitted protests
d. Yes, Spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team)
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e. Yes, Full-scale riots
4. Have you ever participated in the response to a civil disturbance? Yes/No
a. No, I have never participated in the response to a civil disturbance.
b. Yes, Permitted protests
c. Yes, Unpermitted protests
d. Yes, Spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team)
e. Yes, Full-scale riots
5. Have you ever planned for a response to a civil disturbance? Yes/No
a. No, I have never participated in the response to a civil disturbance.
b. Yes, Permitted protests
c. Yes, Unpermitted protests
d. Yes, Spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team)
e. Yes, Full-scale riots
6. Have you ever been in the position of decision making during a civil
disturbance? Yes/No
a. No, I have not been in the position of decision making during a civil
disturbance.
b. Yes, Permitted protests
c. Yes, Unpermitted protests
d. Yes, Spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team)
e. Yes, Full-scale riots
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7. Does your agency have a plan or policies in place to address civil
disturbances? Yes/No
a. No, my agency does not have a plan or policies in place to address civil
disturbances.
b. Yes, my agency does have a plan or policies in place to address civil
disturbances, but, has not incorporated de-escalation techniques.
c. Yes, my agency does have a plan or policies in place to address civil
disturbances and has incorporated de-escalation techniques.
8. The Chaos Theory as it applies to emergency management, implies that an
emergency manager should try to maintain normalcy or return to normalcy
from chaos as quickly as possible, in order to reduce or avoid violence and
destruction. Which would you consider the proper type of response to a civil
disturbance in either maintaining or returning to normalcy?
a. Aggressive
b. Passive
9. In your opinion do you think that considerations regarding social and
economic conditions or political activity, should be given to a situation when
deciding which type of a response to a civil disturbance is conducted, e.g.
aggressive or passive?
a. Yes
b. No
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10. In your opinion, do the current tactics used in the response to civil
disturbances need updating?
a. Yes
b. No
11. How effective do you think de-escalation techniques would be if they were
made a part of response protocols, to reduce or prevent violence during a civil
disturbance?
a. Effective
b. No Difference
c. Ineffective
12. In your opinion, is there a need for the use of de-escalation techniques in civil
disturbances?
a. Yes
b. No
The null hypothesis for each is that no such positive relationship exists.
Reliability
In determining if any errors in validity have occurred, making sure that the
reliability of the survey being completed is crucial to the research. The entire
measurement process must be controlled, and its integrity guarded, from the collection of
data to its presentation in the report, for a confidence in the measurement instrument and
those reading the report (Staron & Meding, 2009). Emergency Management is a
unchanging process of functions, preparation, response, recovery and mitigation, which
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are learned through training and experience. The Emergency Management field has also
had standardization applied within it such as the National Incident Management System
(NIMS) and the National Response Framework (NRF) which allows for a nationwide
approach to restoring order from chaos. By applying the measurement instrument within
the emergency management field, reliability and consistency would be ensured, because
of national standardization, retain its stability over time when used in future surveys
when replicated regardless of where it may be used. By applying the measurement
instrument only within the would ensure reliability (Dantzker and Hunter, 2006).
Validity
Validity is measuring what is intended to be measured (Frankfort-Nachmias &
Nachmias, 2008). To establish validity, this research will use a homogeneous group of
participants from the public safety field (law enforcement and emergency managers) with
actual or preparation experience in civil disturbances. Maxwell (2012) stated, the validity
standard requires the testing of data against the real-world (p. 122). It is the belief of this
researcher that the data in this research when tested against the real world, would easily
achieved validity by the interviewing of another sample of public safety officials with
similar experiences in civil disturbances from another jurisdiction in the United States.
The Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ) was examined for validity and reliability
in a research study by Yazici and Yazici (2010). The study concluded that the EPQ would
be satisfactory for social scientists to utilize while examining individuals and the various
settings that they can be found in.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
Historically, civil disturbances have been responded to in an aggressive manner
using military troops, a “militarized” response by police, and aggressive tactics such as
police dogs and water cannons. The purpose of this study was to examine the hypothesis
of whether current responses by government officials are no longer practical when
applied to civil disturbances or riots and if there a need for de-escalation techniques.
I designed the study from four research questions to identify the types of
disturbances respondents might have experienced, the presence of plans and policies they
may or may not have for responding to them, decision-making factors, and the type of
response they would utilize. The four questions were as follows:
RQ1. Would the lack of experience versus actual experience influence the type of
response action taken?
RQ2. Would training, policies, biases or external stimuli, influence the type of
response action taken?
RQ3. Would the influences of politics, economic or social conditions contribute
to the decision-making factors, such as to respond passively or aggressively?
RQ4. Would the inclusion techniques such as de-escalation contribute positively
in maintaining order in a community?
In the survey both emergency managers and law enforcement officials were asked
about their backgrounds and personal experiences regarding participation, planning, and
decision-making for civil disturbances. Participants were also surveyed as to whether

44
they have or would consider factors such as training, policy, biases, or external
influences, such as underlying political, economic or social conditions of communities, in
their response to an incident. Participants were also asked their opinions on the type of
response they preferred (aggressive or passive), and lastly, the need to update tactics
used, the effectiveness of those changes in tactics would be, and need for the use of deescalation techniques in civil disturbances.
In this chapter, I will present the features of the target population, a
comprehensive discussion of each question and the data collected in the survey, the
conclusions of the study based on a cross-tabulation analyses, additional comments based
on the survey data, and a summary of the key findings.
Data Collection
The target population of this study is a homogenous sample of law enforcement
and emergency management officials responsible for policy or response decisions
regarding civil disturbances, in a major county in the South Florida area with a
population of more than 1.5 million people (United States Census Bureau, 2010) and 31
incorporated towns or cities. I chose this population due to South Florida’s historical
experiences with rioting and civil disturbances.
The chief law enforcement officers and emergency managers from the 31
incorporated municipalities of the county are the target of the survey population. I
identified these participants through open source internet searches at each of the
jurisdiction’s websites and/or searches of the desired position (emergency manager and
police chief) from the internet. It should be noted that, because of contractual
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arrangements, some of the jurisdictions do not have personnel who hold the title of
emergency manager and police chief, but who still perform those duties in differently
titled positions, in those jurisdictions with whom they contract.
This county and its public safety structure is unique in that Sheriff’s Office and
several jurisdictions within the county have entered into contractual agreements to
provide law enforcement and fire services from a county level (Sheriff’s Office) and a
peer-to-peer level (city to city). The presence of these agreements contributes to a
reduction in the number of positions by jurisdictions to reduce costs and duplication of
effort, which affected the sample size. The inclusion of fire services is important to this
research with regards to the target population, because the function of emergency
management is generally located within the fire department.
The following is an example of the county public safety structure. The sheriff’s
office contracts and provides a combination of law enforcement and fire rescue services
to 14 of the 31 jurisdictions, plus the seaport and airport. Of the 14 jurisdictions in which
the sheriff’s office provides services, 10 contracts for both law enforcement and fire
services, while the other four either provide their own services or contract with another
jurisdiction for their fire services. The remaining 17 jurisdictions are not associated with
the sheriff’s office in providing law enforcement or fire services. Regardless of the
contractual status of any of the jurisdictions, there are still those who fill the position of
chief law enforcement officer and emergency manager, who are the target population of
this research.
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The original data collection plan for this study called for the data to be collected
via an interview process and the completion of a survey. Instead, the collection process
was conducted via the internet survey collection service, Survey Monkey
(https://www.surveymonkey.com), which allowed for the creation and distribution of the
survey to the participants. This process allowed for convenience, timeliness, and
anonymity for the participants of the survey. Survey Monkey also provides collection and
analysis tools for the data obtained from the respondents. I contacted the respondents
selected to participate in the survey via e-mail inviting them to participate with a link to
the survey.
When counting each of the 31 jurisdictions and allowing for a participant from
each discipline, emergency management and law enforcement, the total number of
participants would be 62. The goal of this research was to receive a response from at least
20% of those 62, which would equal 12.4 participants. I rounded that number up to 15 to
increase the validity of the survey.
Study Results
Data collection occurred over a period of 14 days, from July 20, 2018 through
August 2, 2018, at which time the total number of participants sought was achieved. The
survey is provided as Appendix B. A total of 26 participants responded to the survey,
with one response being incomplete. The incomplete response was discarded.
The study results were divided into two categories, raw data and cross-tabulation
data. I used the cross-tabulation analysis to gather the respondents’ opinions based on
their respective disciplines and experiences among the different factors contained in the
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survey questions. Those factors included training, policies, biases or external stimuli
(political, economic, or social conditions), and what type of response they believed would
be appropriate for a civil disturbance, aggressive or passive. The raw data is presented in
Tables 1 to 11 and the cross-tabulation data is presented in Tables 12 to 19.
Primary Survey Data
Respondent Demographics
This section of the study results will address the respondent demographics, the
discipline that they mostly closely align with, emergency management or law
enforcement, and the years of experience each has in those disciplines.
The survey received 25 respondents, of whom 18 (72%) were from law
enforcement and 7 (28%) were from emergency management. Table 1 shows a crosstabulation of the disciplines and the years of experience from each respondent. The
results show that law enforcement respondents had more overall years of experience
versus the respondents of the emergency management discipline.
Table 1
Respondent Experience
Disciplines
Emergency management

< 5 yrs

%

5 - 10 yrs %

10-15 yrs % 15-20 yrs % > 20 yrs %

n

%

1

4

1

4

1

4

2

8

2

8

7

28

Law enforcement

0

0

0

0

1

4

1

4

16

64

18

72

Total (n = 25)

1

4

1

4

2

8

3

12

18

72

25

100

Jurisdictional Characteristics
Tables 2 and 3 show the characteristics of the respondents’ jurisdiction with
regards to their experiences with various types of civil disturbances and whether the
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jurisdiction has plans or policies in place to address them. Table 2 shows the types of
civil disturbances that have occurred in a respondent’s jurisdiction and how these
disturbances are characterized. Four respondents 16% responded that their jurisdiction
had never experienced a civil disturbance, eight respondents (32%) had experienced
permitted protests, seven respondents (28%) unpermitted protests, five respondents
(20%) spontaneous protests and only one respondent had experienced a full-scale riot.
Table 2.
Has your jurisdiction experienced a civil disturbance and how would it be characterized?
Emergency
Categories

management

Law
%

enforcement

%

n

%

1

4

3

12

4

16

Yes, permitted protests

3

12

5

20

8

32

Yes, unpermitted protests

2

8

5

20

7

28

Yes, spontaneous (e.g.

0

0

5

20

5

20

Yes, full-scale riots

1

4

0

0

1

4

Total (n = 25)

7

28

18

72

25

100

No, my jurisdiction has not
experienced a civil
disturbance

response to
a championship win by a
sports team)

Table 3 shows the status of the respondent’s agency and whether it has a plan or
policies in place to address civil disturbances. Of the 25 responses received, only 2 (8%)
respondents, did not have an agency plan or policies in place to address a civil
disturbance, while 3 (12%) did have plans and policies in place, but had not incorporated
de-escalation techniques to address civil disturbances. The remaining 20 (80%)
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respondents affirmed that they have incorporated de-escalation techniques into their plans
and policies to address responses to civil disturbances.
Table 3.
Does your agency have a plan or policies in place to address civil disturbances?
Law
Categories

Emergency management %

enforcement

%

n

%

No, my agency does not
have a plan or policies in
place to address civil

2

8

0

0

2

8

1

4

2

8

3

12

16

64

20

80

18

72

25

100

disturbances
Yes, my agency does have
a plan/policies to address
civil disturbances, but
has not incorporated
de-escalation techniques
Yes, my agency does have
a plan/policies to address
civil disturbances and

4

has incorporated

1
6

de-escalation techniques
Total (n = 25)

7

2
8

Respondent Experience
Tables 4, 5, and 6 show the level of a respondent’s personal and planning
experiences and decision-making criterion they would utilize in civil disturbances.
Table 4 shows the individual participatory experiences of all the respondents and
how they are characterized. Seven (28%) respondents stated that they had never
participated a civil disturbance. In examining the remaining characteristics, six or 24% of
respondents stated that they had participated in permitted protests, five or 20%,
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unpermitted protests, three or 12%, spontaneous protests (e.g. Response to a
Championship Win by a Sports Team) and four or 16%, in a full-scale riot.
Table 4.
Respondent Participation Experience in Civil Disturbances
Categories

Emergency management

%

Law enforcement

%

n

%

No, I have never
participated in the

4

16

3

12

7

28

Yes, permitted protests

1

4

5

20

6

24

Yes, unpermitted protests

1

4

4

16

5

20

0

0

3

12

3

12

Yes, full-scale riots

1

4

3

12

4

16

Total (n = 25)

7

28

18

72

25

100

response to a civil
disturbance

Yes, spontaneous (e.g.
response to a
championship win by
a sports team)

The study results found that law enforcement respondents had five times more
people, with at least some civil disturbance participation experience over emergency
management respondents. In the four categories excluding “having never participated in
the response to a civil disturbance”, 15 (60%) of the law enforcement respondents had
some sort of experience versus just three (12%) for emergency management.
Table 5 shows the individual planning experiences of all the respondents and how
they are characterized. Seven (28%) respondents stated that they had never planned a
civil disturbance. In examining the remaining characteristics, seven (28%) of respondents
stated that they had planned for permitted protests, five (20%), for unpermitted protests,
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one (4%), for spontaneous protests (e.g. Response to a Championship Win by a Sports
Team) and five (20%), for full-scale riots.
Table 5.
Respondent Planning Experience in Civil Disturbances
Categories

Emergency management

%

Law enforcement

%

n

%

4

16

3

12

7

28

Yes, permitted protests

1

4

6

24

7

28

Yes, unpermitted protests

1

4

4

16

5

20

0

0

1

4

1

4

1

4

4

16

5

20

28

18

72

25 100

No, I have never planned for a
response to a civil disturbance

Yes, spontaneous (e.g. response to a
championship win by a sports
team)
Yes, full-scale riots
Total (n = 25)

7

The results found that law enforcement respondents as with the participation
aspect above, had five times more people, with at least some civil disturbance planning
experience over emergency management respondents. In the four categories excluding
“having never planned for the response to a civil disturbance”, 15 (60%) of law
enforcement had some sort of experience versus just three (12%) for emergency
management.
Table 6 shows the individual decision-making criterion of all the respondents and
how they are characterized. nine (36%) respondents stated that they had never been
involved in the decision-making processes of a civil disturbance. In examining the
remaining characteristics, nine (36%) of respondents stated that they had been involved
in the decision-making processes for a civil disturbance and based those decisions on
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training, seven (28%), based their decisions on policies and no respondent made any
decisions based on external influences or personal biases.
Table 6.
Respondent Decision-Making Criteria in Civil Disturbances
Categories

Emergency management

%

Law enforcement

%

n

%

4

16

5

20

9

36

2

8

7

28

9

36

1

4

6

24

7

28

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

7

28

18

72

25

100

No, I have not been in the
position of decision making
during a civil disturbance
Yes, my decisions were based
on training
Yes, my decisions were based
on policy
Yes, my decisions were based
on external influences
Yes, my decisions were based
on personal biases
Total (n = 25)

The results found that law enforcement respondents were almost equal in
personnel who had not been in the position of decision-making during a civil disturbance
as emergency management respondents, with five and four respectively. In the “training”
characteristic law enforcement had seven (28%) versus two (8%) emergency
management respondents, the “policy” characteristic showed that there were six (24%)
law enforcement versus one (4%) for emergency management. No respondent from either
discipline made any decisions based on external influences or personal biases.
Respondent Opinion
Tables 7 to 11 show respondent opinions regarding the consideration of external
influencers such as social and economic conditions or political activity, the updating of
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tactics, the potential effectiveness, type of response and need for de-escalation techniques
in civil disturbances.
Table 7 describes the opinions of respondents as to whether outside influences
such as social and economic conditions or political activity, are considered in their
decision-making processes. The results showed that 14 (56%) of all respondents would
not allow outside influences to play a part in their decision-making processes and 11
(44%) would consider them. The comparison of disciplines found that eight (32%) of the
law enforcement respondents and six (24%) emergency management respondents did not
believe that external influences should be considered as a part of their decision-making
process. In contrast, 10 (40%) law enforcement and one (4%) emergency management
respondents, believed that external influences should be considered as a part of their
decision-making process.
Table 7.
Should There Be Considerations for External Influencers (social and economic
conditions or political activity) in the Response to Civil Disturbances?
Categories

Emergency management

%

Law enforcement

%

n

%

No

6

24

8

32

14

56

Yes

1

4

10

40

11

44

Total (n = 25)

7

28

18

72

25

100

Table 8 shows the opinions of respondents regarding the need to update current
tactics used in the response to civil disturbances. Of the responses, 11 (44%) did not
believe that tactics need to change, while 14 (56%) did believe that current response
tactics need to be updated.
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Table 8.
In your opinion, do the current tactics used in the response to civil disturbances need
updating?
Categories

Emergency management

%

Law enforcement

%

n

%

No

2

8

9

36

11

44

Yes

5

20

9

36

14

56

Total (n = 25)

7

28

18

72

25

100

The comparison of disciplines found that nine (36%) law enforcement
respondents and two (8%) emergency management respondents did not believe that
current tactics used in the response to civil disturbances need to be updated. In contrast,
nine (36%) of the law enforcement and five (20%) emergency management respondents,
believed that response tactics to civil disturbances need to be updated.
Table 9 shows the opinions of respondents regarding the effectiveness of deescalation techniques if used in civil disturbances. Most respondents, 14 (56%) believe
that de-escalation techniques would be effective in civil disturbances, while eight (32%)
believe that they would make no difference and three (12%) believed that they would be
ineffective.
Table 9.
How effective do you think de-escalation techniques would be if they were made a part of
response protocols, to reduce or prevent violence during a civil disturbance?
Categories

Emergency management

%

Law enforcement

%

n

%

Effective

5

20

9

36

14

56

No difference

1

4

7

28

8

32

Ineffective

1

4

2

8

3

12

Total (n = 25)

7

28

18

72

25

100
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A comparison of the two groups found that 50% or nine of the law enforcement
respondents, believed that de-escalation techniques would be effective, while the other
50% of law enforcement respondents, believed there would be no difference or
ineffective. In the emergency management group, five believed that de-escalation
techniques would be effective, while one in each category, believed that de-escalation
techniques would either make no difference or be ineffective.
Table 10 shows the opinions of respondents as to which type of response they
would take to maintain normalcy or return from a state of chaos to normalcy in their
jurisdiction, with either an aggressive or passive response. 17 (68%) of the respondents
stated that they would act aggressively, while eight (32%) chose a passive response.
Table 10.
Which would you consider the proper type of response to a civil disturbance in either
maintaining or returning to normalcy?
Categories

Emergency management

%

Law enforcement

%

n

%

Aggressive

4

16

13

52

17

68

Passive

3

12

5

20

8

32

Total (n = 25)

7

28

18

72

25

100

A comparison of the disciplines showed that 13 (52%) law enforcement
respondents and four (16%) emergency management respondents would act aggressively
in their jurisdiction to maintain normalcy or return from a state of chaos to normalcy. In
contrast, five (20%) law enforcement and three (12%) from emergency management
respondents would respond in a passive manner in their jurisdiction to maintain normalcy
or return from a state of chaos to normalcy.
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Table 11 shows the respondent’s opinion for the need of de-escalation techniques
in civil disturbances. The results show that 21 (84%) of respondents believe that there is a
need to include de-escalation techniques in the response to civil disturbances, while four
(16%) do not.
Table 11.
Is There a Need for De-Escalation Techniques in Civil Disturbances?
Emergency
Categories

management

%

Law enforcement

%

n

%

No

1

4

3

12

4

16

Yes

6

24

15

60

21

84

Total (n = 25)

7

28

18

72

25

100

Law enforcement respondents accounted for 15 (60%) of the 21 affirmative
responses while emergency management respondents accounted for the other six (24%)
that there is a need for de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances. Only four
respondents, three (12%) from law enforcement and one (4%) from emergency
management did not believe that de-escalation techniques were needed in civil
disturbances.
Cross-Tabulation Survey Data
This research utilized the experiences of respondents from both the law
enforcement and emergency management disciplines to provide their opinions regarding
training, policies, biases or external stimuli, (politics, economic or social conditions) and
what type of response they believed would be proper to a civil disturbance, aggressive or
passive. To capture these factors, a cross-tabulation analysis was made of the
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respondent’s discipline in which they work and their amounts of experience in those
disciplines, (as shown in Tables 1 and 2) and the remaining survey questions
individually. The cross-tabulation results are presented in Tables 12 – 19.
Respondent Demographics
As stated previously, Survey Questions 1 and 2, were utilized to capture the
respondent demographic information, the discipline each identified with and the amount
of experience within it. As described above, there were 18 respondents from the law
enforcement discipline and seven from the emergency management discipline, for a 72%
to 28% statistical difference. Table 1 described the experience levels of the respondents.
The LE discipline had 18 respondents, all of which had more than 10 years of
experience. Sixteen of the eighteen law enforcement respondents had more than 20 years
of experience, while one had 10 to 15 years, one with 15 to 20 years of experience,
respectively and none in the lower two categories. The emergency management discipline
received seven responses in total, with only four respondents having more than 15 years
of experience and one in each of the lower experienced categories.
Table 12 describes the type of response by discipline and experience. Survey
question #8, asked respondents, what type of response they would take, aggressive or
passive, to maintain normalcy or restore normalcy according to the chaos theory. It could
be expected that emergency management respondents may not be as aggressive as their
law enforcement counterparts, but the results showed that four chose an aggressive
response action versus three who chose a passive response. The results were very evenly
split on the type of response regardless of years of experience. Contrary to the emergency
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management respondents, law enforcement respondents chose an aggressive response
most notably in the years of experience they had. 11 of the 13 respondents who would
choose an aggressive response to either maintain normalcy or return to a state of
normalcy had been in law enforcement more than twenty years, while the other two
respondents each had more than ten and fifteen years of experience respectively.
Table 12
Type of Response by Discipline and Experience
Discipline
Emergency management

Experience
< 5 yrs

Aggressive

%

1

4

0

5 - 10 yrs

0

0

10-15 yrs

1

15 - 20 yrs
> 20 yrs
Total emergency management

Passive

%

n

%

0

1

4

1

4

1

4

4

0

0

1

4

1

4

1

4

2

8

1

4

1

4

2

8

4

4

3

12

7

28

< 5 yrs

0

0

0

0

0

0

5-10 yrs

0

0

0

0

0

0

10-15 yrs

1

4

0

0

1

4

15 - 20 yrs

1

4

0

0

1

4

> 20 yrs

11

44

5

20

16

64

Total law enforcement

13

52

5

20

18

72

Grand total (n = 25)

17

68

8

32

25

100

Law enforcement

The survey results found that as a practical matter, law enforcement, because of
their primary role in addressing civil disturbances, were the more experienced
respondents versus emergency managers. The data suggests that an aggressive posture
while responding to a civil disturbance, based on the years of experience by both law
enforcement and emergency management, is the preferred manner of response.
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Jurisdictional Characteristics
Survey questions 3 and 7 addressed jurisdictional experiences and the status of
planning and policies of a respondent’s jurisdiction. The respondents were asked to
describe historically what types of civil disturbances had occurred in their jurisdiction, if
their jurisdiction had plans for a civil disturbance and if the those plans included or did
not include, de-escalation techniques.
Survey question number 3 examined five categories of jurisdictional experiences,
no experience, permitted protests, unpermitted protests, spontaneous protests and fullscale riots. The jurisdictional experience found that four (16%) had never experienced a
civil disturbance and one (4%) had experience a full-scale riot for a total of 20% of the
population. The remaining 80% of the population’s jurisdictions had experienced
permitted, unpermitted and spontaneous protests of some kind. This experience level is
constant with the response of survey question 8, regarding the type of response
aggressive or passive, in which respondents, 68% of whom, would respond aggressively,
while 32% would respond passively.
Survey Question 7 asked respondents if their jurisdiction had plans or policies in
place to respond to civil disturbances. Of the 25 respondents, 23 (92%) stated that their
jurisdiction has plans for civil disturbances, 20 (80%) of which stated that de-escalation
plans had been incorporated into those plans. It is also notable that four (16%) of the
respondent’s jurisdictions had not experienced a civil disturbance and two (8%) had no
plans or policies in place to respond to them.
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Jurisdictional characteristics can contribute to the discussion of the type of
response taken by a respondent, as much as their personal experiences. This may be due
in part to a lack of different types of civil disturbances in those jurisdictions, which may
be directly attributed to a lack of experience on the part of a respondent.
Respondent Experience
Respondents were surveyed about their personal experiences participating in,
planning for and their decision-making rationale, for civil disturbances. The survey
questions were designed to address research questions two and three, which asked if
training, policies, biases or external stimuli, such as politics, economic or social
conditions, contributed to or influenced decision-making factors, in the type of response
action taken. Survey Questions 4, 5, and 6 were utilized to elicit the experience of the
respondents.
Survey Question 4 examined respondent personal experience in actual civil
disturbances. Seven (28%) of the 25 respondents had no personal experience of actual
participation in a civil disturbance of any kind. Fourteen (56%) of the respondents had
participated in a permitted, unpermitted and spontaneous disturbance, and four in fullscale riots.
Survey Question 5 examined the planning experience of respondents in civil
disturbances. As in the participation category, seven (28%) of respondent did have any
experience, in this case, planning for a civil disturbance. Thirteen respondents had
planning experience in a permitted, unpermitted and spontaneous disturbance, and five in
full-scale riots for a combined experience total of 72%.
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Survey Question 6 describes the factors which respondents who have been in the
position of authority, utilized in their decision-making processes for civil disturbances.
The decision factors that were considered by respondents included, no experience,
training, policy, external influences and personal biases. In this question, nine
respondents (36%) which is slightly higher than the previous two questions, had no
decision-making experiences for civil disturbances. In the other two categories, Training
and Policy, nine respondents (36%) based their decision-making on training and seven
(28%) on policy, which combined, accounted for a total of sixty-four percent. There were
no responses to categories examining external influences or biases for a zero percentage.
In order examine whether respondent experiences would influence the type of
response they would take as suggested in the research questions, a cross-tabulation
analyzation of the three survey’s experience Survey Questions 4 (participation), 5
(planning) and 6 decision-making, were conducted against Survey Question 8, (the type
of response which a respondent would use to maintain or return a jurisdiction to
normalcy), with the following results.
Table 13 illustrates the results of the comparisons of the respondents’
participation experience and type of response they would utilize in responding to a civil
disturbance. A total of 25 responses were received with 17 (68%) of respondents
answering that they would respond to a civil disturbance in an aggressive manner, versus
eight (32%) who opted for a passive response. For those who had never participated in a
civil disturbance, three respondents opted for the aggressive response, while four would
use a passive response. The remaining categories under the aggressive response, each
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received either three or four responses, while the passive response categories were
different. In the passive response category, spontaneous events and full-scale riots did not
register any passive responses, but the permitted and un-permitted categories each
received three and one responses respectively.
Table 13.
Respondent Participation Experience in Civil Disturbances and Response Type
Categories

Aggressive

%

Passive

%

n

%

No, I have never participated in the response to a civil disturbance

3

12

4

16

7

28

Yes, permitted protests

3

12

3

12

6

24

Yes, unpermitted protests

4

16

1

4

5

20

3

12

0

0

3

12

Yes, full-scale riots

4

16

0

0

4

16

Total (n = 25)

17

68

8

32

25

100

Yes, spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports
team)

Table 14 illustrates the results of the comparisons of the respondents’ planning
experience and type of response they would utilize in responding to a civil disturbance.
As in the participation category, total of 25 responses were received with 17 (68%) of
respondents answering that they would respond to a civil disturbance in an aggressive
manner, versus eight (32%) who opted for a passive response.
Table 14.
Respondent Planning Experience in Civil Disturbances and Response Type
Categories

Aggressive

%

Passive

%

n

%

No, I have never participated in the response to civil disturbance

4

16

3

12

7

28

Yes, permitted protests

4

16

3

12

7

28

Yes, unpermitted protests

4

16

1

4

5

20
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Yes, spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports

1

4

0

0

1

4

Yes, full-scale riots

4

16

1

4

5

20

Total (n = 25)

17

68

8

32

25

100

team)

Table 15 illustrates the results of the comparisons of the respondents’ planning
experience and type of response they would utilize in responding to a civil disturbance.
As in the participation category, total of 25 responses were received with 17 (68%) of
respondents answering that they would respond to a civil disturbance in an aggressive
manner, versus eight (32%) who opted for a passive response.
Table 15.
Respondent Decision-Making Rationale in Civil Disturbances and Response Type
Categories

Aggressive

%

Passive

%

n

%

5

20

4

16

9

36

Yes, my decisions were based on training

8

32

1

4

9

36

Yes, my decisions were based on policy

4

16

3

12

7

28

Yes, my decisions were based on external influences

0

0

0

0

0

0

Yes, my decisions were based on personal biases

0

0

0

0

0

0

17

68

8

32

25

100

No, I have not been in the position of decision making during a civil
disturbance

Total (n = 25)

In Table 13, the type of response was broken down by discipline and experience,
but the data in Table 16 will be examined for the type of response and the experience
level of the respondents only. Respondents by a two to one margin, seventeen aggressive
versus eight passives, believed that an aggressive response was the best way to maintain
normalcy or return to normalcy during a civil disturbance. Respondents with more than
20 years of experience, 12 (48%) in total, believed that an aggressive response was
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proper versus six (24%) who opted for a passive response. The remaining responses to
the aggressive category were found in the <5 years, one (4%), two (8%) in 10 to 15 years
and two (8%) in the 15 to 20 years of experience categories. The remaining passive
responses were associated with respondents with five to ten years and fifteen to twenty
years of experience categories.
Table 16.
Respondent Opinion for Response Type in Civil Disturbances
Categories

Aggressive

%

Passive

%

n

%

< 5 yrs

1

4

0

0

1

4

5 - 10 yrs

0

0

1

4

1

4

10-15 yrs

2

8

0

4

2

8

15 - 20 yrs

2

8

1

3

12

> 20 yrs

12

48

6

24

18

72

17

68

8

32

25

100

Total (n = 25)

As Table 17 shows, 14 (56%) respondents did not believe that considerations
should be given to social, economic or political activity during times of civil disturbance,
while 11 (44%) did believe in their inclusion. In trying to answer the question of whether
experience was a factor for respondents, those with over 20 years of service, equally
stated that they would and would not consider external influencers, with nine (36%) each.
The remaining experience categories completed the survey results.
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Table 17.

Respondent Opinion for Considerations Regarding Social and Economic
Conditions or Political Activity
Respondent experience

No

%

Yes

%

n

%

< 5 yrs

0

0

1

4

1

4

5 - 10 yrs

1

4

0

0

1

4

10-15 yrs

2

8

0

0

2

8

15 - 20 yrs

2

8

1

4

3

12

> 20 yrs

9

36

9

36

18

72

14

56

11

44

25

100

Total (n = 25)

As illustrated in Table 18, the opinions showed that 11 (44%) of respondents did
not believe there was a need to update current tactics used in civil disturbances while 14
(56%) did believe there was a need to update. Once again as observed in the previous
question (Table 17) those with more than 20 years of experience accounted for a total of
18 (72%) of the respondents, with 10 (40%) believing there was no need to change tactics
and eight (32%) believed there was a need for change.
Table 18.

Respondent Opinion for Updating Response Tactics
Respondent experience

No

%

Yes

%

n

%

< 5 yrs

0

0

1

4

1

4

5 - 10 yrs

0

0

1

4

1

4

10-15 yrs

0

0

2

8

2

8

15 - 20 yrs

1

4

2

8

3

12

> 20 yrs

10

40

8

32

18

72

11

44

14

56

25

100

Total (n = 25)

As illustrated in Table 19, 14 (56%) of respondents did believe that de-escalation
techniques in civil disturbances would be effective, 8 (32%) believed there would be no
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difference and three (12%) believed they would be ineffective. Once again as observed in
the previous questions (Tables 16, 17 and 18) those with more than 20 years of
experience accounted for most of the total responses with 18 (72%). 10 (40%) of the
respondents believed de-escalation techniques would be effective, seven (28%) believed
there would be no difference and three (12%) thought they would be ineffective.
Table 19.
Respondent Opinion on the Effectiveness of De-Escalation Techniques in Civil
Disturbances
Respondent experience

Effective

%

< 5 yrs

1

4

5 - 10 yrs

0

10-15 yrs

No difference

%

Ineffective

%

n

%

0

0

0

0

1

4

0

0

0

1

4

1

4

0

0

1

4

1

4

2

8

15 - 20 yrs

3

12

0

0

0

0

3

12

> 20 yrs

10

40

7

28

1

4

18

72

Total (n = 25)

14

56

8

32

3

12

25

100

Table 20 provides the results of the Survey question #12 and the respondent’s
opinion, as to whether there is a need for the use of de-escalation techniques in civil
disturbances. Overwhelmingly, 21 (84%) of respondents agreed that there was a need for
de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances, while four (16%) did not. Of the 21
respondents who believed that de-escalation techniques needed to be a part of the
responses to civil disturbances, 16 had 20 or more years of experience, three had 15 – 20
years, one had 5 -10 years and one had less than five years of experience. Of those
respondents which did not believe there was need for de-escalation techniques in civil
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disturbances had two respondents with 10 – 15 years of experience and two with more
than twenty years.
Table 20.
Respondent Opinion on the Need for De-Escalation Techniques in Civil Disturbances
Respondent experience

No

%

Yes

%

n

%

< 5 yrs

0

0

1

4

1

4

5 - 10 yrs

0

0

1

4

1

4

10-15 yrs

2

8

0

0

2

8

15 - 20 yrs

0

0

3

12

3

12

> 20 yrs

2

8

16

64

18

72

Total (n = 25)

4

16

21

84

25

100

Summary
The objective of this study was to examine whether there was a need to include
de-escalation techniques in the responses to civil disturbances. The survey was designed
to elicit the opinions of respondents on the various aspects of response within a civil
disturbance. Respondents were categorized by discipline, law enforcement and
emergency management, and by the years of experience in those disciplines. The
respondents were asked about the historical experiences of their jurisdictions, as well as
their own experiences regarding participation, planning and decision-making with civil
disturbances. Lastly, the respondents provided their opinions on the type of response they
would use, the consideration of external influences, the need for new tactics, the
effectiveness of de-escalation techniques and the need for de-escalation techniques in
civil disturbances.
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The central question in this study was to identify from the respondents whether
there was a need for de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances. Overwhelmingly, 21
(84%) of respondents agreed that there was a need for de-escalation techniques in civil
disturbances, while at the same time, suggested that an aggressive response was their
choice to either maintain or restoring order, by a two to one margin. These two results
provided a sharp contrast in thinking with regards to response, because while the
respondents believed that de-escalation techniques should be included in response plans,
the aggressive posture was the preferred response option. Additionally, a solid majority
of respondents believed the need for de-escalation techniques, 56% believed that they
would be effective, while 44% either thought there would be no difference, or they would
be ineffective.
The opinions and experiences of respondents were a crucial part of this study to
determine the need for changes in policies and responses to civil disturbances. The
respondents that did reply to the survey were found to be very experienced in both law
enforcement and emergency management disciplines. The results showed that 23 of the
25 respondents (92%) had 10 or more years of experience. But, even with the many of
years of experience possessed by the respondents in their respective disciplines, there was
a lack of experience in the number of disturbance types they had been involved with. The
results showed that the types of disturbances most experienced by the respondents
involved either permitted, non-permitted or spontaneous incidents, noticeable lack of
experience with full-scale riots from either discipline.
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The jurisdictional aspect of each respondent also found that 80% had already
established de-escalation techniques in their agencies response policies to civil
disturbances. This aligns with the 84% who believed that there was a need for deescalation techniques in the responses to civil disturbances.
Chapter 5 provides an interpretation of the findings, limitations of the study,
recommendations for future research, and discusses the implications of these findings.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Discussion
For many decades, jurisdictions have used aggressive and violent means to
respond to civil disturbances. Methods have included the use of armed military troops,
police dogs, and riot forces to maintain control or regain normalcy. The purpose of this
study was to evaluate the opinions and experiences of emergency managers and law
enforcement officials, on how they would respond to civil disturbances and whether they
believe there is a need to incorporate de-escalation techniques into response policies, as
tactics, that could be used to reduce the destruction often associated with riots, as well as
the violence between protestors and the police.
The goal of this study was to extend the current literature on the subject as
described in Chapter 2. Currently, the literature on de-escalation techniques is limited to
the treatment of the mentally ill, the use of force by police, and verbal de-escalation
measures, but I found nothing regarding the application of de-escalation measures to civil
disturbances. It is in the realm of civil disturbances that this study will contribute to the
subject matter.
In this study, I incorporated three theoretical frameworks, working in conjunction
with each other, to describe and interpret the various stages of a civil disturbance
experienced by respondents and how their responses would apply to a disturbance. The
chaos theory was the primary framework of the three used in this study because it
governs response. The chaos theory suggests that as a society, in most cases, we live in a
stable and normal environment and, on occasion, an event occurs that moves the

71
normalcy of society into chaos. It is the responsibility of emergency managers and law
enforcement officials to take steps to either maintain normalcy or return from chaos to
normalcy as quickly as possible. In doing so, the decisions being made by emergency
managers and law enforcement officials may involve external influencers, biases, or a
lack of experience. The second theoretical framework I used is the BDT, to understand
the decision-making thought process of emergency managers and law enforcement
officials in how they deal with those external influencers, biases or a lack of experience.
The third framework being used is the strain theory, which help emergency managers and
law enforcement officials to understand what may be causing the external influences that
may affect the decisions being made by those emergency managers and law enforcement
officials while trying to maintain normalcy or return society from chaos. The strain
theory, developed by Merton (as cited in Marker, 2004), suggests that those participating
in civil disturbances would normally be law abiding citizens if it weren’t for individual
failures of societal goals such as education, political stature, and financial independence.
The three frameworks complement each other in that the facets of the strain theory could
explain the influences affecting the decision-making process in BDT, which could
manifest itself as a decision during a civil disturbance in either a positive or negative
way, causing an incident not to be returned to normalcy from a state of chaos or sending
normalcy into chaos.
Interpretation of Findings
I used the four research questions in this study to examine whether the lack of
experience, training, policies, biases, or external stimuli (political, economic, or social
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conditions), would influence the type of response taken in a civil disturbance.
Additionally, through the research questions, I sought to determine if the previously
mentioned influences would affect the decision to respond either aggressively or
passively. Lastly, the respondents provided opinions as to whether de-escalation
techniques would be effective either in a positive or negative manner. These factors
ultimately contributed to the research in trying to determine whether there was a need for
de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances.
As described in Chapter 2, there is little research on de-escalation techniques as
they are applied to civil disturbances. Because the historical examples of response
methods in civil disturbances have been more aggressive rather than passive, I designed
the survey questions to elicit opinions from the respondents as to why this was occurring.
The respondents were asked about their opinions and decision-making rationale through
the survey questions to establish experience levels for themselves and their jurisdictions,
the factors on which they based their decisions, and what types of responses they might
make during a civil disturbance.
The survey questions targeted the previously mentioned issues to provide
quantitative data that either does or does not support the research theories. The survey
questions were organized into four parts: demographic information about the
respondents, their experience and opinions and jurisdictional characteristics. The
questions regarding the respondents’ opinions were based in the chaos theory and what
kinds of responses would be used in civil disturbances. The questions in the survey
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regarding participation, planning, and external influences contributing to decision-making
in civil disturbances were aligned with the BDT and the strain theory.
Summary
This study was designed to elicit the opinion of respondents about the need for deescalation techniques in civil disturbances. Because of the lack of literature in this area of
de-escalation techniques and civil disturbances, the data could not be compared to
previous findings. This study extends the limited research of whether de-escalation
techniques are needed in the responses to civil disturbances. It is this lack of literature on
this subject which allows this study to extend the knowledge of this subject. The subject
of de-escalation techniques is a new concept for civil disturbances and the results of this
research confirmed that. Currently, there is no research into the different aspects of
experience, decision-making or jurisdictional preparedness with regards to civil
disturbances and the need or not, for de-escalation techniques.
The study found that experience was a strong factor among respondents from law
enforcement, but in comparison, the emergency management respondents were lacking in
that same experience. All 18 law enforcement respondents had 10 years or more of
experience, whereas only five emergency management respondents had that same amount
of experience. This finding about experience level provides a historical context not only
for their opinions based on training and experience, but one aspect of experience that was
not surveyed was the point in the respondents’ career that the experience was garnered or
how long it had been since they had the experience.
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This study also extends the knowledge base with regards to jurisdictional
experiences and the status of de-escalation techniques in plans or policies within them.
The data results showed that only one respondent’s jurisdiction had experienced a fullscale riot, whereas all other experiences were limited to permitted or unpermitted protests
or spontaneous events, like sports celebrations. The study results showed that a large
percentage of respondents’ jurisdictions have plans for civil disturbances and did
incorporate de-escalation techniques into those plans.
This study also extends knowledge of current policy makers in jurisdictions, on
whether there is a need to consider external influencers, such as economic or social
conditions. The inclusion of these considerations could affect how training is conducted,
the updating of agency policies, and the decision-making aspects in response to civil
disturbances. In the three categories surveyed, respondent participation in, planning for,
and decision-making abilities for civil disturbances, all responded equally to what course
of action each would take. The respondents in all three categories, by an 18 to 7 total,
chose an aggressive response over a passive one.
The premise that a lack of experience versus actual experience in civil
disturbances could influence the type of response action taken (aggressive versus
passive), was supported by a 72 to 28% margin. As illustrated in Table 16, the results
showed that experience was indeed a factor with respondents in determining the type of
response that they would take. The category representing the most experienced
respondents (> 20 years) showed that 12 of the 25 respondents would apply an aggressive
style response to a civil disturbance. A further examination of all the respondents with
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more than 10 years of experience showed that 16 of 17, would prefer an aggressive
response.
Law enforcement and emergency managers must decide on a course of action in
formulating response plans in times of civil disturbances. Morton and Fasolo (2009) in
the BDT suggested that courses of action taken by people may be influenced by biases
and other factors. BDT may be applied in a response scenario by escalating a scenario
versus considering external influences such as social and economic conditions or political
activity. The respondents did not believe that external influencers should be considered
when deciding which type of response to a civil disturbance is conducted (e.g., aggressive
or passive) by a 56 to 44% margin.
Historically, civil disturbances or riots have been responded to aggressively with
the use of police dogs, armed federal troops, and police field forces. Respondents did
believe that updating tactics used during civil disturbances should be implemented, by a
56 to 44% margin. Fifty-six percent of respondents believed that de-escalation
techniques, if incorporated into the response to a civil disturbance, would be effective,
32% believed they would have no difference, and 12% believed de-escalation techniques
would be ineffective. If the categories of no difference and ineffective were combined,
they would have a total percentage of 44%, versus the 56% effective respondents. The
categories of updating tactics and the effectiveness of de-escalation techniques (if the
categories of no difference and ineffective were combined) were statistically equal, but
contradictory. The contradiction comes from a perceived necessity to improve tactics but
at the same time without trying, admitting that they would not be effective.
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When asked, if there was a need for de-escalation techniques to be incorporated
into policies and response protocols, 84% of respondents answered in the affirmative
with 16% negative. This question summarizes the entire survey with a resounding
affirmation for the need to include de-escalation techniques into the response protocols
and policies currently in place with regards to civil disturbances.
In conclusion, the results of this study have some contradictory instances between
the need to include de-escalation techniques and the type of response favored by most
respondents. The respondents while identifying a need for de-escalation, also
overwhelmingly found that an aggressive response is best in response to civil
disturbances.
Limitations of the Study
In this study, limitations were observed, acknowledged and addressed. A
limitation of quantitative studies by their nature require very large samples, in most cases
in the thousands of respondents. Additionally, most organizations, jurisdictions and the
public sector, do not have the resources or skills required to conduct a large-scale
quantitative study. The positive aspects of quantitative studies include the ability to be
administered and assessed quickly, as well as allow for comparisons between
organizations and groups, in this case, emergency managers and law enforcement
officials (Choy, 2014).
An additional limitation of this study is the cross-sectional design which does not
allow for researchers to randomly control their intrinsic and extrinsic variables or control
the causation of independent variables (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2008).
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Concerns regarding extrinsic variables should be minimal since this study used
participants that currently work in the fields of emergency managers and law
enforcement. Since the participants were selected from a specific geographic area, it is
then assumed that the same disciplines could be identified and surveyed from a larger
jurisdiction such as a state, multiple states or even nationally to replicate the survey on a
larger scale. Intrinsic variable changes to survey would include factors such as the
changing experiences of participants or changes in the population due to retirements,
promotion or reassignment to other duties (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2008).
A generic representative sample of the emergency managers and law enforcement
positions was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The purpose of this data was
to calculate a percentage of emergency managers and law enforcement chiefs in the
United States and then compare that percentage against the study’s results. According to
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017) there are 9,560 professionals classified as
emergency management Directors, and Banks, Hendrix, Hickman, and Kyckelhahn
(2016) estimate there are approximately 18,000 federal, state, county, and local law
enforcement agencies. If the stipulation is made that each of these law enforcement
agencies had a chief officer (Sheriff, Police Chief or Director), the number of the
population would include the 9,560 emergency management directors, plus the 18,000
Chief law enforcement officers, creating a control group totaling 27,560. When
calculated for percentages, the combined Labor Department statistics, emergency
management directors accounted for 35% of the population and law enforcement
executive officers for 65%. In comparison, the results from the study showed a response
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rate of 28% for emergency management respondents and 72% for law enforcement
respondents. It is suggested that the differences between the emergency management
study group and the statistical group is a -7 percent, while the law enforcement study
group had a +7 percent over the statistical group.
Recommendations
De-escalation techniques while a part of most jurisdictional policy, still need to be
incorporated into the response tactics of jurisdictions, to help reduce confrontation
between protestors and law enforcement. The study showed that by a 2:1 ratio, that the
respondents believed that an aggressive posture during a response was the best way of
quelling a civil disturbance, while a 5:1 ratio believed that there is a need for deescalation techniques. This shows a possible issue regarding how policies may not be
keeping pace with societal norms and progress.
Government entities of any size can utilize the results of this study to aid in
determining if their agency is need of policy adoptions or revisions, regarding the need
for the inclusion of de-escalation techniques. Agency decision-makers can adopt some or
all the strategies provided in this study, by examining the potential risks brought on by
civil disturbances and the effects on their jurisdictions, with the training of their
personnel and incorporating de-escalation techniques into response protocols and policy.
The results of this study showed that a majority of respondents, had many years of
experience in their respective disciplines. While the study did gather basic data on
personal and jurisdictional experiences, the research did not address the specifics of how
that experience was gathered over individual careers. One very important aspect of
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individual experience is training and while the research found that a large number of
respondents were very experienced within their disciplines, it did not examine at what
point in their careers that they received their training which could make it irrelevant, due
to outdated response protocols. Determining the relevance of training is important to
future research because it may have become outdated by advances in technology, legal
precedence or changes in tactics by protestors. Based on these criterion, the training that a
person may have received in the first one or two years of their careers may, twenty years
later, no longer be viable options for a response to a civil disturbance. It is recommended
that future research examine the levels or types of training taken by respondents, whether
that training was standardized or ongoing over the course of a career.
The results of the study showed an overwhelming consensus that there is a need
for de-escalation techniques. A further recommendation is to include de-escalation
techniques as a part of an agency’s policies. This would include a complete review by
agencies of their emergency operations plans, specifically their annex regarding civil
disturbances (if an agency has one), training, equipment and mutual aid agreements, all of
which contribute to the way an agency responds to civil disturbances.
Many law enforcement and emergency management agencies are now accredited
by national and international bodies to provide standardization in areas such as
organization, use of force and mutual aid. It is also recommended that accrediting
organizations with oversight over law enforcement and emergency management
disciplines, incorporate de-escalation techniques into their standards. It is also suggested
that a national standard be developed with the help of these accreditation organizations at
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a federal level to establish a consistency across both the law enforcement and emergency
management disciplines for using de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances.
My recommendations would be for agencies to review their policies and
protocols, the way they train and the social, economic and political landscapes of their
jurisdictions to see if there is a method to reduce confrontations and violence. While
eliminating confrontation and violence may not be practical in every situation, the
development of de-escalation techniques may prove to be beneficial in some instances.
Implications
The benefit of this research will provide a social impact by policy changes which
could create a positive impact in lessening the severity and scope of an incident. As
discussed previously, historical response tactics have included armed federal troops,
dogs, water cannons and currently, “militarized field forces” from law enforcement. The
data from this study showed that 56% of respondents believed there was a need to update
response tactics. A change in response tactics could lead to a reduction in confrontations
between law enforcement and protestors and ultimately a reduction of violence and
destruction. Several factors that could prove beneficial and impactful towards achieving
social change need to include changes in tactics, training and standardization.
The changes in tactics could include new technologies which may allow for the
use of less personnel in responding to a civil disturbance. According to Simonson and
Staw (1992) the mere appearance of a deployment of a “field force” unit, could be
interpreted as an “escalation” factor by protestors. New technologies may be useful in
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accomplishing the desired result of force multiplication without deploying the actual
resources as previously used.
Training could prove to be one of the most important factors considered in the
response to civil disturbances. The standardization of training would be most beneficial
as impact on social change. When there is no standardization in training, responses can
vary as much as an incident. Standardized training allows for emergency managers to
establish policy and protocols based on the training being conducted at a current moment
and time. As changes occur, the standard is changed and then taught to personnel to
maintain a level of proficiency. Standardization also allows for the seamless integration
of agencies during mutual aid incidents because all personnel have been trained to the
same standard.
The results of this study have determined that there is a need for the inclusion of
de-escalation techniques and they would effective in civil disturbances. While
respondents believe that an aggressive response is the preferred method to restoring or
maintaining order, they also believe that there is a need for a change in tactics.
Jurisdictions need to address their policies and protocols to determine how they can
include de-escalation techniques, to try and deter confrontations and violence, which may
occur unnecessarily and could have been easily avoided by changes in the way responses
are made in civil disturbances.
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Appendix A: Ethics Position Questionnaire EPQ
Instructions. You will find a series of general statements listed below. Each represents a
commonly held opinion and there are no right or wrong answers. You will probably
disagree with some items and agree with others. We are interested in the extent to which
you agree or disagree with such matters of opinion. Please read each statement carefully.
Then indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree by placing in front of the
statement the number corresponding to your feelings, where:

1 = Completely disagree

4 = Slightly disagree

1 = Moderately agree

2 = Largely disagree

5 = Neither agree nor disagree

8 = Largely agree

3 = Moderately disagree

6 - Slightly agree

9 = Completely agree

1. A person should make certain that their actions never intentionally harm another even
to a small degree.
2. Risks to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of how small the risks might
be.
3. The existence of potential harm to others is always wrong, irrespective of the benefits
to be gained.
4. One should never psychologically or physically harm another person.
5. One should not perform an action which might in any way threaten the dignity and
welfare of another individual.
6. If an action could harm an innocent other, then it should not be done.
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7. Deciding whether or not to perform an act by balancing the positive consequences of
the act against the negative consequences of the act is immoral.
8. The dignity and welfare of people should be the most important concern in any
society.
9. It is never necessary to sacrifice the welfare of others.
10. Moral actions are those which closely match ideals of the most "perfect" action.
11. There are no ethical principles that are so important that they should be a part of any
code of ethics.
12. What is ethical varies from one situation and society to another.
13. Moral standards should be seen as being individualistic; what one person considers to
be moral may be judged to be immoral by another person.
14. Different types of moralities cannot be compared as to "rightness."
15. Questions of what is ethical for everyone can never be resolved since what is moral or
immoral is up to the individual.
16. Moral standards are simply personal rules which indicate how a person should behave
and are not to be applied in making judgments of others.
17. Ethical considerations in interpersonal relations are so complex that individuals
should be allowed to formulate their own individual codes.
18. Rigidly codifying an ethical position that prevents certain types of actions could stand
in the way of better human relations and adjustment.
19. No rule concerning lying can be formulated; whether a lie is permissible or not
permissible totally depends upon the situation.
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20. Whether a lie is judged to be moral or immoral depends upon the circumstances
surrounding the action.
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Appendix B: Survey Questions
1. Which discipline do you most closely align your duties?
a. Emergency Management
b. Law Enforcement
2. What is your experience (in years) in this position?
a. Less than 5 Years
b. 5 - 10 Years
c. 10 - 15 Years
d. 15 - 20 Years
e. More than 20 years
3. Has your jurisdiction experienced a civil disturbance?
a. No, my jurisdiction has not experienced a civil disturbance.
b. Yes, Permitted protests
c. Yes, Unpermitted protests
d. Yes, Spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team)
e. Yes, Full-scale riots
4. Have you ever participated in the response to a civil disturbance?
a. No, I have never participated in the response to a civil disturbance
b. Yes, Permitted protests
c. Yes, Unpermitted protests
d. Yes, Spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team)
e. Yes, Full-scale riots
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5. Have you ever planned for a response to a civil disturbance?
a. No, I have not planned a response to a civil disturbance.
b. Yes, Permitted protests
c. Yes, Unpermitted protests
d. Yes, Spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team)
e. Yes, Full-scale riots
6. Have you ever been in the position of decision making during a civil disturbance?
a. No, I have not been in the position of decision making during a civil
disturbance.
b. Yes, my decisions were based on Training.
c. Yes, my decisions were based on Policy.
d. Yes, my decisions were based on External Influences.
e. Yes, my decisions were based on Personal Biases.
7. Does your agency have a plan or policies in place to address civil disturbances?
a. No, my agency does not have a plan or policies in place to address civil
disturbances.
b. Yes, my agency does have a plan or policies in place to address civil
disturbances but has not incorporated de-escalation techniques.
c. Yes, my agency does have a plan or policies in place to address civil
disturbances and has incorporated de-escalation techniques.
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8. The Chaos Theory as it applies to emergency management, implies that an
emergency manager should try to maintain normalcy or return to normalcy from
chaos as quickly as possible, in order to reduce or avoid violence and destruction.
In your opinion, which would you consider the proper type of response to a civil
disturbance in either maintaining or returning to normalcy?
a. Aggressive
b. Passive
9. In your opinion, do you think that considerations regarding social and economic
conditions or political activity, should be given to a situation when deciding
which type of a response to a civil disturbance is conducted, e.g. aggressive or
passive?
a. Yes
b.

No

10. In your opinion, do the current tactics used in the response to civil disturbances
need updating?
a. Yes
b. No
11. In your opinion, how effective do you think de-escalation techniques would be if
they were made a part of response protocols, to reduce or prevent violence during
a civil disturbance?
a. Effective
b. No Difference
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c. Ineffective
12. In your opinion, is there a need for the use of de-escalation techniques in civil
disturbances?
a. Yes
b. No

